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Abstract 
The EU played an instrumental role re-starting the international development policies in 
Central and Eastern European member states, but questions remain about how far this policy 
area has been Europeanized since accession. Focusing on the Czech Republic, Hungary, 
Poland and Slovakia, the paper investigates why the new donors have been reluctant to adopt 
the EU’s development acquis more fully. The paper traces the process of the EU’s 
development policy rulemaking and subsequent national rule implementation to understand 
the socialization opportunities these processes offer. The conclusions reveal thrre reasons 
why socialization has been weak: (1) perceptions among the new member states on the 
development acquis’ procedural legitimacy; (2) low domestic resonance with the 
development acquis; and (3) inconsistencies in the activities of norm entrepreneurs. The 
paper contributes to our understanding of development policy in the EU, in particular how 
decision making takes place within the Council and its Working Groups post enlargement.  
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Introduction  
Accession to the European Union has had profound influences on official development 
assistance (ODA) in a number of member states like Ireland, Spain or Austria (see 
contributions in Hoebink and Stokke, 2005), with membership resulting in a range of changes 
from the creation of a policy from scratch to the scaling up of aid commitments. The situation 
in the Central and Eastern European (CEE) new member states (NMS) is similar, as without 
EU accession conditionality this policy is unlikely to have existed in the NMS. The EU 
clearly articulated that its members, as part of the developed world, have the responsibility to 
provide aid to developing countries, and the CEE countries duly created their respective 
bilateral ODA policies between 2001 and 2003, with Romania and Bulgaria following suit 
after 2007. While the EU can clearly be credited with pushing the creation of these policies, it 
is difficult to argue that it had much influence on the course these took after the CEE 
countries became members; therefore post-accession compliance needs further study.  
The aim of the paper is to explain the ‘reluctance’ four of the NMS (the Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Poland and Slovakia) have shown in approximating their ODA policies to the EU’s 
acquis communautaire in development policy since their accession. These four states were 
chosen for a variety of reasons; their links through the Visegrád group, their similar histories 
of development policy under Communism, and their similar policy trajectories over the past 
10 years. The paper focuses on similarities between the four states rather than offer a 
comprehensive comparative study. Although the EU has provided limited (if any) material 
incentives for the NMS in this regard, one may still argue that the dense interaction setting 
between the NMS and the EU institutions in case of development policy should have led to 
some degree of socialization. Therefore, Europeanization, which has frequently been 
employed to explain both political and policy reform in candidate countries (Sedelmeier, 
2011) and also compliance with EU law in the NMS (Epstein and Sedelmeier, 2008), is used 
as a framework. While the rational model of Europeanization has traditionally been the 
preferred framework to explain the extent of compliance with EU legislation in both settings 
(although with variations among policy areas), the area of development policy constitutes an 
ideal case study to examine the relevance of social learning for several reasons. First, there is 
very little legally binding development acquis and thus little possibilities for direct 
conditionality. Second, the fact that the EU’s development acquis aims at increasing the 
effectiveness of foreign aid in terms of poverty reduction grant it a certain moral force, which 
could be conducive to socialization. While the paper itself does not wish to take any 
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normative stance on how appropriate the EU’s development acquis is in terms of poverty 
reduction, or that ‘more EU’ in ODA policy leads to greater effectiveness, there is a global 
consensus on ODA policy reforms similar to those embodied in the acquis. Third, there are 
dense interactions between member state officials and the EU institutions on development 
policy issues and fourth, there is a strong presence of potential norm entrepreneurs in the 
policy area, which try to exert normative pressure on governments.  
The paper concentrates on explaining why socialization has thus far proven inadequate in 
promoting substantial change in the ODA policies of the four NMS by examining how the 
scope conditions for effective socialization have played out in the past decade. The 
hypothesis of the paper is that an unconducive environment for socialization weakens long 
term compliance with the EU’s development acquis in the NMS. Process tracing, a method 
widely employed in the EU literature (see Checkel, 2001) is used to understand the 
possibilities offered for socialization in the process through which the EU’s development 
acquis is made and later implemented in the four national capitals. The paper concludes that 
several factors in this process hinder socialization. The four NMS seem less than fully 
engaged in making the EU’s development acquis and these rules seem to have a low level of 
resonance with national beliefs on ODA policy. Norm entrepreneurs like domestic 
development NGO coalitions often only promote the EU norms which fit their interests. The 
European Commission (EC), which could also be conceived as a norm entrepreneur, has no 
clear strategy to promote socialization. 
The contribution of the paper to the literature is threefold. First, the existence and 
effectiveness of socialization pressures in post-accession settings is still an under-researched 
topic, and development policy is an ideal case to examine them. Existing studies on 
Europeanization of NMS ODA policies only marginally explore the role of socialization 
(Lightfoot, 2010; Horky, 2012). Second, while there is now an emerging body of literature on 
development policies of the new member states,3 the dynamics of political decision making, 
as well as the factors which influence these are still not well understood. By opening the 
‘black box’ of development policy making at the EU and the national level, the paper not 
only reveals important dynamics in EU development policy but also contributes to our 
understanding of intra-institutional and member state interactions in the Council and its 
Working Groups. Finally, the paper adds to the existing literature on the role of socialization 
                                                            
3 See for example the edited volume by Horky-Hluchan and Lightfoot (2012). 
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to promote Europeanization within the field of EU external relations. The following section 
presents the framework of the paper, as well as details on methodology and data collection. 
This is followed by the empirical section, which examines the making of the development 
acquis and issues affecting its implementation in the NMS. 
Europeanization and Social Learning in Development Policy  
The concept of Europeanization has been extensively used in the literature to explain why EU 
member states and candidate countries adopt or fail to adopt certain political provisions or 
policy-level regulations, norms or ‘ways of doing things’ advocated by the EU. The 
definition of Radaelli (2003: 30) is used, as modified by Moumoutzis (2011: 612): 
Europeanization is ‘a process of incorporation in the logic of domestic discourse, political 
structures and public policies of formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, 
styles, “ways of doing things” and shared beliefs and norms that are first defined in the EU 
policy processes’. Europeanization is therefore understood in this paper as a top-down 
process, and issues related to bottom-up Europeanization, i.e. member states attempting to 
upload their policy agendas to the EU level, are beyond the scope of the paper.4 The two 
main mechanisms for explaining this rule adoption process are conditionality (based on 
rationalist institutionalism) and socialization (based on constructivist institutionalism), and 
have been documented extensively in the literature (see for example Checkel, 2001; 
Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2005; Juncos, 2011).  
As ‘foreign aid has served as a microcosm of donor states’ foreign policies’ (Hook 1995, p. 
16), and during the accession negotiations development policy was a part of the chapter on 
external relations, it makes sense to use the Europeanization literature on EU foreign policy 
as a point of departure, even though development policy is more ‘Communitized’ than 
foreign policy in general. Using the socialization model to explore change at the national 
level has often been employed in the EU foreign policy literature (Smith, 2000; Tonra, 2001; 
Moumoutzis, 2011; Wong 2007), and most importantly it has been used on several occasions 
to study the foreign policies of the NMS as well (Pomorska, 2011; Bátora, 2012; Baun and 
Marek, 2013). Just like in the case of foreign policy, the relative lack of a legally binding 
acquis suggests that socialization can be the only mechanism to explain domestic level policy 
change induced by EU processes in the case of development policy as well (see Baun and 
                                                            
4 There are examples of uploading, especially in the case of NMS transition experience that would merit further 
exploration.  
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Marek, 2013). Development policy is a shared parallel competence between the EC and 
member states and the EC thus cannot legally influence the individual priorities of the 
member states. Sedelmeier (2011: 23) implies that the EU may rely more on socialization 
strategies to exert influence over its member states, as the lack of binding rules means that 
there is little direct conditionality. 
The content of the acquis provides a second reason why socialization is a good approach to 
studying development policy. Much of the EU’s development acquis relates to the common 
development policy and is thus not directly applicable in member states. However, there is a 
growing body of recommendations for the bilateral ODA policies of the members (Orbie, 
2012). These recommendations, mainly in the form of Council Conclusions, form an 
extensive body of ‘soft law’ instruments that are not binding, ‘but rest solely on their moral 
force’ (Carbone, 2007 p. 50). The most important and frequently reiterated recommendations 
include the following:  
 For NMS, increase aid spending to 0.33% of their gross national incomes (GNI) by 
2015, and setting out an ODA growth path to achieve this (Council of the European 
Union, 2007);  
 changing geographical aid allocation to devote more resources to Africa and least 
developed countries, while also recognizing the value of concentrating member state 
activities in areas and regions where they have comparative advantages (European 
Consensus, 2006);  
 untying aid from exports (European Consensus, 2006);  
 increasing policy coherence for development (Council of the European Union, 
2012a);  
 better coordination between the bilateral policies of member states (European 
Consensus, 2006),  
 engaging in joint actions and multiannual programming with other donors (Council of 
the European Union, 2011a);  
 reducing the number of countries and sectors supported in order to avoid 
fragmentation (Council of the European Union, 2011a); 
 increasing transparency (Council of the European Union, 2011b). 
 making increased use of the budget support modality (Council of the European Union, 
2012b) 
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Third, member state officials frequently interact with each other and the EU institutions on 
development policy issues, leading to a dense policy making setting which has been 
described to be conducive to socialization. Fourth, there is a strong presence of potential 
norm entrepreneurs, often linked to transnational epistemic communities in the policy area, 
which try to exert normative pressure on governments (see Denca, 2009). Fifth, other states 
experienced various degrees of socialization in this policy field post accession, notably 
Ireland and Spain. Alonso (2005 p. 497-8) argues that EU membership played a key role in 
the evolution of Spanish aid that saw Spain go from a recipient of aid in 1979 to be the 11th 
largest donor of aid in 2003. The socialization of Spain can be seen as successful, as despite 
rollbacks due to the Euro-zone crisis, the country remains committed to development policy 
(OECD-DAC, 2011b). Finally, there is the specific aspect of Europeanization in post-
accession settings. If accession conditionality was the main tool that induced behavioral 
changes among the new member states, compliance may decrease post accession thus 
weakening the EU’s influence (Epstein and Sedelmeier, 2008; Sedelmeier 2011), leaving 
socialization as the only mechanism that can generate compliance.  
The socialization model argues that actors will follow a logic of appropriateness, and they 
will adopt the relevant norms and laws not because they have to (as in the conditionality 
framework), but because these rules become internalized and a conviction gradually develops 
that they represent the only proper way to act (de Flers and Muller, 2010). A key argument in 
the socialization literature is that such convictions can develop even in face of opposing 
material interests, such as a lack of resources. The paper acknowledges that material interests 
and the lack of conditionality can play an important role in inducing non-compliance in the 
short term in NMS development policies, however, looking at material interests alone cannot 
tell the whole story. Scholars in the Europeanization literature have long argued however that 
the two models should not be seen as complementary, not mutually exclusive (Sedelmeier, 
2011: 10). Short term non-compliance based on rational cost-benefit calculations does not 
mean that socialization processes cannot exist in parallel. Socialization, in spite of the 
material incentives, may induce behavioural change and the internalization of the EU’s 
development norms among the NMS. One must explore the existence and strength of these 
socialization pressures to get the fuller picture on why the NMS (fail to) comply with the 
EU’s development acquis.  
Europeanization assumes that the main variable affecting national policy outcomes are 
adaptation pressures from the EU level. The literature on the aid performance of donors 
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(Lancaster, 2007; Chong and Gradstein, 2008; Dang et al., 2013) however also looks at the 
influence of many other economic, social and political variables as well, many of which are 
internal to the donor countries, while also highlighting the need for strong adherence to 
internationally accepted development norms (van der Veen, 2011). Therefore, several further 
potential explanations are possible for the state of affairs in CEE ODA policies beyond 
material interests and socialization, most importantly the influence of various domestic 
interest groups.5 Domestic constituencies for aid in the NMS are weak (Szent-Iványi, 2012), 
leaving international pressure as the main potential source of policy change. None the less, 
the socialization model used in this paper has a strong explanatory power, as incorporates 
domestic actors and their influence on ODA policy outcomes, as well as social learning by 
these actors. 
Turning to the question of compliance in the NMS, development policy is an especially 
interesting case in point. The EU conditionality prior to accession was characterized as a 
‘monologue not a dialogue’.6 During the accession negotiations, there was a provision that 
the acceding member states must set up ODA policies, but little direction was given on what 
this policy should include, how it should be organized and what level of resources the 
candidate countries should devote to it (Lightfoot, 2010). As a result, the creation of ODA 
policies was seen as a technical hurdle by the accession countries, albeit a hurdle with clear 
foreign policy connections, with few costs and little domestic opposition (Szent-Iványi and 
Tétényi, 2013). In the beginning EU pressure was ‘important’, but after accession the 
‘pressure is off’ as ‘no one is pushing from Brussels’.7 A quick glance at the bilateral 
development policies of the NMS reveals that they comply with very few of the 
recommendations contained in the acquis (Horky, 2012; Szent-Iványi, 2012). For example, 
the NMS channel a very small portion of their aid to Africa, most of their aid is tied to 
exports, they do not provide budget support, and there is no evidence of them taking part in 
joint programming efforts. This observation has led Szent-Ivanyi (2012) to argue that 
Hungarian officials have learned to ‘talk the talk’ of Brussels, whilst Horky (2012) adopts the 
term ‘shallow’ Europeanization.  
                                                            
5 See for example Szent-Iványi (2012) which develops several potential explanations for the state of affairs in 
the case of Hungarian ODA policy. 
6 The authors thank Prof. Dave Allen for this observation. 
7 Interview with an MFA official from a NMS, 3 November 2009; and with an NGDO official, 26 July 2010. 
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The paper focuses on understanding the socialization processes faced by the Ministries of 
Foreign Affairs (MFAs), as they are the most important actors in official bilateral 
development policies. As stated earlier, we utilise process tracing (see also Kittel and Kuehn 
2013) to track how the EU’s development acquis is made, perceived and implemented and 
how conducive this process is for socialization. We intend to identify how strongly the scope 
conditions for successful socialization are present, by tracing this rule making and 
implementing process. Scope condition can be grouped into two categories (Sedelmeier 2011: 
13): international and domestic factors. International factors mainly refer to the legitimacy of 
the EU rules. The more legitimate EU rules are perceived, the more likely it is that actors will 
internalize them in the long term. According to Clark (2007: 196), legitimacy can either be 
derived from the process through which the rules are made (procedural legitimacy) or their 
normative content (substantive legitimacy).8 The first approach argues the rules will be 
perceived as legitimate, regardless of their content, if the process of rulemaking is seen as 
democratic, inclusive and participatory. Inclusiveness of the rule making process refers to  
the capacity of states to participate in a meaningful way rather than just their formal 
participation. The characteristics of the rule making process also matter beyond legitimacy. 
Socialization is more likely to occur in less politicized settings, and its likelihood also 
increases the more contacts member state officials have with the rule promoters (Lewis, 
2005). The second approach derives legitimacy from the content of the rules: they will be 
seen as legitimate regardless of how they were made if they are normatively consistent, 
effective at a solving a given issue, are acted out in practice by authoritative actors, or a 
broader (beyond-the-EU) consensus exists on their appropriateness (Sedelmeier, 2011: 15).  
Two issues are investigated in case of domestic factors. The first issue relates to policy 
resonance. How well do the specific rules advocated by the EU resonate with target country 
decision makers? Do they have any ingrained, prior beliefs on the issue? Are these 
compatible with EU rules? The second domestic factor is the presence of norm entrepreneurs, 
who themselves act as (additional) socializing agents and try to educate the governments. 
Such norm entrepreneurs in the case of development policy may be the EC, the OECD 
Development Assistance Committee (DAC) or national Non-Governmental Development 
Organisations (NGDOs) and any EU-wide epistemic community they may be linked to. The 
gradual internationalization of the norms embodied in the EU’s development acquis in the 
new member states can be difficult to identify. While elite interviews are the only way to gain 
                                                            
8 The authors thank Prof. Jason Ralph for this observation. 
9 
 
information on changing perceptions and identities, these changes are difficult to tease out 
(Lewis, 2005). Any shift in allegiances will take time, elites may stick to official rhetoric in 
interviews, and even when identity changes are apparent, they may not confess it (or they 
may not even be aware of it).9 Understanding the scope conditions that make socialization 
likely is therefore a more fruitful approach than explicitly testing gradual changes in elite 
identities. The most important sources of data are 42 qualitative interviews carried out 
between 2008 and 2013. People interviewed included current and former development 
diplomats at the permanent representations to the EU of the four countries, senior MFA 
officials in the respective capitals, officials from the Commission, the Council Secretariat and 
the European External Action Service (EEAS), as well as representatives of the national 
NGDO platforms and leading NGDOs. The interviewees remain anonymous due to reasons 
of confidentiality.10 Data collected through the interviews was triangulated using official 
documents from the CEE countries on development strategies, as well as evaluations carried 
out by the OECD DAC and national NGDO platforms.  
Socialization along the Development Policy Making Process 
The nature and making of the development acquis 
As mentioned, the EU’s development acquis includes a wide range of recommendations for 
member states to implement in their national ODA policies. These recommendations are 
proposed by the EC in the form of Commission Communications, which basically provide a 
draft text for the member states to discuss in the Council. The final outcomes are – with very 
few exceptions – in the form of Council Conclusions, and carry no explicit legal obligations 
for the member states to transpose them to their domestic legislation or base national policies 
on them. The wordings in the Council Conclusions clearly hint at this non-compulsory 
nature, with phrases like ‘Member States are invited to develop or review their own 
guidelines in the light of these Council Conclusions […]’ (Council of the European Union, 
2012b, p. 4) being common.  
                                                            
9 Wong and Hill (2011) outline a number of specific issues raised by utilizing interviews for Europeanization 
research. However, the large number of interviews relative to the number of people working in ODA in the 
NMS, as well as triangulation with other data sources provides soundness to the conclusions.  
10 Given the small number of people working in international development policies in the NMS and that 
interviewees may be identifiable even if anonymized, details on the nationalities of interviewees or the location 
of the interviews when citing interview data are not provided. 
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The rule making process may have important socializing effects on the members, both in 
terms of its perceived legitimacy and beyond. While it is the Council that makes the final and 
formal decision on the EU’s development acquis, it is the Council Working Group on 
Development (CODEV) that makes the actual decisions in the broad majority of the cases. 
CODEV is composed of specialized diplomats from the member state permanent 
representations in Brussels, and prepares the development-related agenda of the Committee 
of Permanent Representatives (COREPER) and thus ultimately the Council. CODEV meets 
at least once a week, and many of the member state diplomats (especially in case of smaller 
states) also represent their countries in other Council working groups, thus they interact 
frequently. The work of CODEV, which spans a wide range of strategic level issues, from 
sexual reproductive rights to the developmental impact of trade, was described as ‘rather 
informal’, friendly, co-operative and consensus-driven group by member state diplomats and 
EU officials, although member states do have ‘red lines’.11 Thus, CODEV appears to be a 
forum conductive to socialization. CODEV is chaired by the rotating presidency, but much of 
its agenda is driven by the EC, and increasingly since the Lisbon Treaty, the EEAS. There is 
an informal goal to reach an agreement on the policy issues discussed, thus dossiers rarely go 
undecided to COREPER. Member states can be grouped into three groups in CODEV, 
depending on the issue. The first group of states behave as passive observers, with no 
interests at stake in the given issue, or expertise on it. These states often only use the group as 
a platform for learning and getting information on the topic. The second group of states will 
most likely drive the discussion as they have a strong interest in the issue and significant 
expertise. The third group is composed of states that do care for the issue and have some red 
lines, but will not drive the debate.12  
How the NMS perceive the workings of CODEV and how meaningfully they are involved in 
its work are important elements when it comes to evaluating the perceived procedural 
legitimacy of rule making in CODEV. During the interviews, a number of themes emerged 
that suggest less than full participation, which may have an impact on perceived legitimacy 
and thus openness to socialization. First, NMS almost never drive the issues in CODEV, only 
occasionally falling into the third group of ‘carers’ and in most cases are only passive 
observers.13 One NMS diplomat noted that the work of this group does not really concern 
                                                            
11 Interview with an EC DG Development official, 21 January 2013. 
12 Interview with an official from the EEAS, 23 January 2013. 
13 Interview with an official from the Council Secretariat, 22 January 2013. 
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them, but it is ‘interesting none the less’.14 Another argued that his country has little to 
contribute as they are not doing anything in the issue area.15 An official from the EEAS noted 
that the NMS ‘tend to be on the quieter side, while representatives from the UK or France 
tend to talk a lot’16.  
The second theme has to do with the capacities of the NMS to participate fully in the work of 
CODEV. Representatives from the NMS rarely receive detailed instructions from their 
capitals. Whilst this is not unusual in foreign policy (see Juncos and Pomorska, 2011; 
Chelotti, 2013), the NMS have additional problems in the field of development that 
exacerbate the problem. These include low policy staff numbers at MFAs, which means that 
they simply cannot react to all the issues discussed in CODEV and in many cases think it is 
unnecessary to do so, as no national interest is at stake.17 Contrast this with CODEV 
representatives from established donors like Sweden, who receive detailed instructions on 
almost every issue discussed. Also, large older member states (OMS) can often afford to have 
a separate diplomat for every Council working group, while the CODEV representative of 
smaller NMS typically has other additional tasks.  
The third theme relates to the backgrounds of NMS CODEV representatives. While CODEV 
reps from the OMS generally have a strong development background, those from the NMS 
are usually career diplomats. Critics highlight that the diplomatic practice of rotation gives 
them a shorter time perspective as they will only be in post three years (Horky, 2012). In 
addition, much of their tenure in CODEV must be devoted to learning the ropes from scratch, 
thereby making them less effective.18 Evidence from the interviews suggests that some form 
of social learning is taking place in the build up of institutional memory within the NMS 
because, as one EU official noted ‘every new [NMS] representative is a bit better than the 
previous one was when (s)he had been new’, in a sense that they have better understandings 
of development issues and more knowledge on how development policy works. None the less 
examples such as this still exist: ‘I struggle getting feedback, and this has several factors: […] 
there is a lack of capacity, recently we have had a cut in personnel, the fact that I have to 
                                                            
14 Interview with a diplomat from a NMS, 22 January 2013. 
15 Interview with a diplomat from a NMS, 25 April 2013. 
16 Interview with an official from the EEAS, 23 January 2013. 
17 Interview with a diplomat from a NMS, 23 January 2013. 
18 Interview with an NGDO official, 26 July 2010. 
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cover such a wide range of issues with no experience in this field, and no one has done me a 
handover’.19  
Fourth, while NMS seem to be novices, they rarely ask for advice from other (old) member 
states or from the EC and the EEAS, even though asking for advice and conducting informal 
discussions seem to be very much the norm in CODEV.20 One interviewee highlighted the 
‘closed doors within ministries’ when it came to learning from the EU.21 Also, NMS 
diplomats make much less use of networking opportunities and are not seen as often on EC 
organized events outside of CODEV than diplomats from the OMS do.22 Some NMS 
diplomats clearly felt that they are treated as outsiders in the policy area by both the OMS 
and the EC. 
Fifth, NMS seem to place a large emphasis on ‘transition experience’ and the Eastern 
neighbourhood (Non-paper, 2011). This was seen to be an area where they have comparative 
advantages over other donors, although there was a feeling among EU officials that they do 
this at the expense of the myriad of other issues discussed in CODEV. One EU official 
actually called this an ‘obsession’ with transition experience.23 Most NMS diplomats 
interviewed argued that the EU should make greater use of their transition experience as it 
was true value added, but there seems to be a feeling that OMS are not only not convinced by 
this argument, but are often irritated by how NMS diplomats always return to this mantra.  
Sixth, there are issues on which recurring political tensions exist between the NMS and the 
OMS. Beyond transition experience, one such issue is the Eastern Neighbourhood. While the 
NMS would be keen on providing more support to the region, the older members, especially 
the UK and France, see these efforts as threats to the EU’s focus on Sub-Saharan Africa. 
NMS have also been lobbying for preferential treatment in aid project implementation tenders 
for their national NGDOs, which the older members oppose. 
These six themes may have an impact on how the NMS perceive the procedural legitimacy of 
rulemaking in CODEV. Potential socialization is weakened by their lower capacities and 
lower interest (aside from some specific niche issues like transition experience) to participate 
                                                            
19 Interview with a NMS diplomat, 31 October 2008. 
20 Interview with an EC DG Development official, 21 January 2013. 
21 Interview with a NMS diplomat, 1 April 2011. 
22 Interview with an EC DG Development official, 21 January 2013. 
23 Interview with an official from the Council Secretariat, 22 January 2013. 
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in making the development acquis, and there seems to be a feeling of being outsiders in this 
policy area with little to contribute. 
Turning to the substantive legitimacy of the development acquis, this can be seen as strong 
and difficult for any country to dispute, even the NMS. For one, the main goal of the 
development acquis is to increase the effectiveness of the EU’s development efforts through 
greater strategic guidance, coordination and joint initiatives, thereby reducing global poverty. 
The fragmentation of donors and the lack of coordination among them increases the costs of 
foreign aid, places large administrative burdens on recipients and leads to wasteful parallel 
efforts. Counter-arguments that donor pluralism has its merits are in a clear minority (Frot 
and Santiso, 2010). The rules embodied in the acquis can therefore be seen as normatively 
consistent. There is also a broader, ‘beyond-the-EU’ consensus on much of the rules, as 
major parts of the development acquis can be seen as an EU-level translation of global 
initiatives. The fundamentals of the acquis are clearly linked to Millennium Development 
Goals and quantitative aid targets are derived from the Monterrey Consensus (Orbie, 2012). 
The rules aimed at increasing aid effectiveness link in to the global aid effectiveness agenda, 
such as the Paris Declaration, the Accra Agenda and the Busan Partnership. There are voices 
examining whether the EU is the best possible forum for donor coordination (see Maxwell et 
al., 2010 for a discussion), yet it cannot be disputed that the EU, as one of the largest global 
donors, has done the most in practice by undergoing a spectacular transformation in the past 
decades to become a rather effective aid agency (Carbone, 2007). There is always room for 
improvements of course, like a recent report by the European Court of Auditors (2010) 
showed in the case of budget support, but the general direction of EU development practice is 
clearly towards improving the effectiveness of aid in reducing poverty. All these factors 
suggest substantive legitimacy of the EU’s development acquis is strong, something no NMS 
official interviewed disputed. Rather they questioned the acquis’ appropriateness for their 
national policy contexts. This however has more to do with resonance, one of the domestic 
issues we turn to next. 
National implementation of the development acquis 
Once a Council Conclusion is released, how does it enter national policy making? The 
general impression emerging is that the NMS rarely make use of these documents. According 
to one diplomat interviewed, ‘there is nothing to implement on Council Conclusions, as they 
14 
 
are not law’.24 Other statements are also telling: ‘the Conclusions are used as a source of 
inspiration’25 or help ‘fine tune’ national policy documents. Others interviewees were not 
even aware that Council Conclusions often include recommendations for bilateral 
development policies and thought they exclusively refer to the common development policy. 
None of the four MFAs have formal procedures for debating Council Conclusions and 
channeling them into domestic policymaking. Legal and policy documents in the NMS 
usually make some vague reference to the EU level, and the Czech Republic and Slovakia 
even explicitly mention the European Consensus as containing principles which influence the 
country’s development policy. Beyond these references, it is very difficult to find examples 
of specific acquis transposed into domestic legislation or strategies. Any actual impact 
beyond this rhetoric is even more dubious. As an EC official put it, ‘[the NMS] tend to forget 
the European dimension’.26 
NMS see little need to channel Council Conclusions into national policies due to low policy 
resonance stemming from prior, ingrained beliefs on development policy. These beliefs run 
against many of the norms set out in the various EU documents listed in the previous section. 
Almost all MFA representatives voiced concerns as to how relevant the EU recommendations 
are for their contexts, or even argued outright that they are unsuitable for the realities in the 
NMS. Budget support was one of the most frequently mentioned examples.27 The EU pushes 
for increased usage of this modality based on the grounds that it is more effective (Council of 
the European Union, 2012b). The NMS however resist using budget support claiming that it 
would lead to decreasing visibility of their efforts and that they would have little influence on 
how the money is actually spent. Another example is joint programming, an issue which the 
EU promotes as the main tool for donor coordination and reducing donor fragmentation 
(Council of the European Union, 2011a). NMS diplomats argue that their countries have little 
capacities in the field, and as they could only contribute relatively small resources to joint 
programs, they would have little influence on how the programs are designed and 
implemented. A pilot initiative for joint actions in Moldova, organized by the EC in 2011-12, 
provides an example of this reluctance for working together. Some NMS, such as Hungary 
                                                            
24 Interview with a diplomat from a NMS, 23 January 2013. 
25 Interview with a diplomat from a NMS, 21 January 2013. 
26 Interview with an EC DG Development official, 21 January 2013. 
27 Budget support involves the transfer of resources directly to the recipient’s budget, giving the recipient 
government much larger discretion in deciding what to spend the money on. 
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abstained from it totally, while the involvement of others was characterized as unenthusiastic 
and low-key.  
While resistance to implementing the acquis in the issues above may stem from material 
interests, often the lack of money, these arguments have also become strong ingrained 
narratives which no ministry official was willing to question. Material interests alone cannot 
explain why these beliefs were uniformly strong in all four NMS, even when some of them, 
like the Czech Republic, have significantly higher per capita spending on ODA than others. 
Material interests also cannot explain why in light of the financial crisis aid spending 
remained relatively constant. There is thus only limited evidence of resonance with most of 
the EU rules, highlighting that Socialization may be difficult in face of such strong ingrained 
beliefs.  
National NGDOs form an important group of norm entrepreneurs that can play a role in 
gradually changing these beliefs by lobbying governments and also pressing for the 
implementation of EU rules.  NGDOs in all four countries created advocacy platforms in the 
early 2000s in order to speak with a single voice towards the government, and EU accession 
has done much to strengthen them by providing them access to EU financing and 
membership in wider epistemic communities such as the EU-wide development NGDO 
network CONCORD.28 The NGDO platforms clearly make efforts to influence their national 
government, enjoying as they do special consultative status with their respective governments 
and producing regular ‘Aidwatch’ reports on the government’s activities. NGDOs act as 
watchdogs, but are also beneficiaries of government funds as implementers of development 
projects. This fact makes their advocacy work Janus-faced, which becomes clear when 
looking at national Aidwatch reports. While in principle they lobby governments to increase 
development effectiveness, they rarely mention issues which could harm their access to 
government funding, such as budget support. Hungarian NGDOs for example talk rather 
vaguely about increasing aid quality, without going into details on exactly how (HAND, 
2011). Czech NGDOs mainly focus on rather technical issues when discussing aid quality 
like publishing tender forecasts (FORS, 2012). NGDOs do however seem highly committed 
to increasing bilateral aid, and refer to the 0.33% target of the acquis frequently. This 
‘selectiveness’ in which aspects of the acquis to promote and which not can make one 
                                                            
28 Interviews with representatives from NMS NGDO platforms (10 April 2008, 4 February 2013, 5 March 2013) 
and CONCORD (23 January 2013). 
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question just how much NGDOs can be conceptualized as norm entrepreneurs as opposed to 
self-interested agents. 
The EC itself can also be thought of as a potential norm entrepreneur. As the initiator of the 
acquis, it could be logical to assume that it would promote actual implementation as well. 
Indeed, the EC has developed some tools to assist the NMS in implementation and through 
this also provide additional channels for socialization. There is a weekly breakfast meeting 
between NMS CODEV representatives and EC officials, and the EC has also been running 
several ‘capacity building’ schemes for the NMS, which focus mostly on technical training, 
but the 2011-12 round attempted a more practical approach with the joint actions in Moldova 
mentioned above.29 Capacity building however is to be phased out soon. Opinions on what 
role the EC should play greatly diverged. Some NMS diplomats complained that the EC is 
not doing enough to help the NMS, and does not show an understanding of their problems.30 
Others argued that the capacity building offered is very ‘light’ and a more hands on approach 
would be needed.31 It was also mentioned that EC assistance has been rather marginal 
compared to capacity building initiatives from other organizations like the United Nations 
Development Program.32 EC officials on the other hand argued that they cannot force things, 
and it is ultimately the responsibility of the NMS to implement what they had agreed to. The 
Commission ‘presents examples but it is entirely flexible; countries can choose their own 
path’.33 Whatever the merits of this argument, the EC does not seem to have any explicit 
strategy to socialize the NMS, and seems unwilling to engage in one. 
A third norm entrepreneur is the OECD DAC, which is charged with collecting statistics on 
ODA, as well as spreading best practices between members. The four NMS were only 
observers of the DAC up to 2013. While the DAC has its own agenda and set of 
recommendations of its own for member states and candidates, these are also rooted in the 
global aid consensus and are thus highly similar to what is contained in the EU acquis. 
Besides offering training and opportunities for informal learning, the most high profile tool of 
the DAC for educating the NMS have been the ‘special peer reviews’ (OECD, 2007; 2009; 
2011a). These reviews evaluate the development policy of the country and contain a number 
                                                            
29 Interview with an EC DG Development official, 21 January 2013. 
30 Interview with a diplomat from a NMS, 23 January 2013. 
31 Interview with a diplomat from a NMS, 21 January 2013. 
32 Interview with a diplomat from a NMS, 19 March 2012. 
33 Interview with an EC DG Development official, 29 October 2008. 
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of recommendations for future reform, most of which are highly compatible with the EU 
acquis. The DAC has published such reviews for the Czech Republic, Poland, and Slovakia, 
but the actual impact of the special reviews is questionable. They are either totally ignored in 
some of the countries,34 or only the more technical recommendations are acted upon. One 
exception is the review of the Czech Republic (OECD, 2007), which most likely had an 
impact on the transformation of the institutional structure of ODA in the country in 2009 
which led to the centralization of the ODA budget in the MFA. Recommendations however 
on increasing aid levels, increasing aid effectiveness by employing the principles of the Paris 
Declaration, or reducing the fragmentation of allocation went largely ignored.  
Conclusions 
This paper has hypothesized that long term compliance with the EU’s development acquis in 
the NMS has been weak due to the unconducive environment for socialization. The Czech 
Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia have been donors of foreign aid and members of the 
EU for a decade now. These ten years plus of interactions might lead to expectations that 
some socialization must have taken place, even though the EU has few legally binding rules 
on member state development policies (see Horky, 2012). Any Europeanization however 
seems rather shallow and superficial. The lack of conditionality or material incentives can 
only partly explain the feeling that the NMS are ‘reluctant donors’. The paper has argued that 
few possibilities for socialization exist in the current processes of how development policy is 
made both on the EU and member state level. Examining the scope conditions which make 
socialization more likely, it is only the strong substantive legitimacy of the development 
acquis which could promote a change in values and beliefs. All other factors seem to go 
against this and limit the possibilities for socialization. Due to lower capacities and lower 
interest in development policy, NMS are rather passive in making the development acquis, 
which decreases its perceived procedural legitimacy. MFAs have no formal methods for 
channeling the acquis into national policies, which reflects the fact that they perceive much 
of it to be inappropriate for their situation. Resonance between the EU acquis and national 
beliefs is clearly low. Last but not least, there are no norm entrepreneurs that clearly and 
consistently try to educate governments and promote the implementation of principles 
embodied in the acquis. The OECD DAC may be an exception, but its recommendations 
often go ignored.  
                                                            
34 Interview with a diplomat from a NMS, 22 January 2013. 
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The conclusion contained in much of the literature that socialization in EU foreign policy is 
weak is supported by our research on the NMS ODA policies. Reviewing the DAC peer 
reviews and various NGDO Aidwatch reports shows that many member states see the 
development acquis as a menu from which they choose the aspects that suit their bilateral aid 
policies. Even Spain and Austria, which have made significant steps to approximate their 
ODA policies to principles embodied in the EU acquis, have important shortcomings. None 
the less, recent OECD DAC’s peer reviews (see OECD, 2009) clearly show that many of the 
EU-15 have indeed carried out significant reforms in their ODA policies in the past 10 years 
with a view of initiating changes similar to those in the acquis (such as cutting the number of 
partners and sectors in Ireland, the Netherlands and Sweden, increasing ODA spending in the 
UK, increasing aid allocated to the poorest countries by Austria, Ireland or France, or making 
poverty reduction a stated goal in several donors), which may be results of different ingrained 
beliefs due to different historical trajectories (such as having a colonialist past) or stronger 
public support for development effectiveness leading to more consistency in the activity of 
norm entrepreneurs. Socialization may also take longer time to happen than the 10 years the 
NMS have had. There is clearly more scope here for comparative research. 
An important conclusion for the wider Europeanization literature relates to the role played by 
the European Commission. The case of development policy shows that there is a clear 
potential, and perhaps also demand for the EC to take a more assertive role as a norm 
entrepreneur. The issue of weak socialization must be faced up to by the EC, and it should 
reconsider its current stance against engaging in more active socialization strategies. The fact 
that the Czech Republic, Poland and Slovakia joined the DAC in 2013 may provide more 
international socialization pressures, which could in turn reinforce weak Europeanization 
processes. On the other hand, the DAC they joined is now struggling to maintain its relevance 
in a highly evolving international development landscape, with new donors like China, 
Brazil, Russia or India offering alternatives to developing countries. The challenge of 
emerging donors also provides an answer as to why the EC should care about socializing the 
new members. If Europe is to maintain its influence in the developing world, particularly post 
2015, it must act in a more concerted and coherent way, and having ‘reluctant’ donors that do 
not totally share the common view of development policy fatally weakens this unity.  
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